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Abstract 
 
This paper tries to establish who carries the burden in supporting reproductive health and AIDS programs 
worldwide. The 1994 International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo established 
goals for the expansion of assistance in matters of reproductive health and AIDS. This global effort has so far not 
sufficiently been supported by funds and this paper looks at what lies behind the level of funds and the sharing of 
financial burdens. Panel data on expenditures for population and AIDS activities funded by 21 donor countries 
for the years 1983-2002 are examined by means of dynamic panel data estimation. On an aggregated scale small 
donors ‘exploit’ the large donors: large donors give more resources than their ‘fair share’, i.e. their income 
weight in the group of donors. However, this picture is not true for the finance and support for multilateral 
organizations where every donor country pays its fair share. The exploitation hypothesis is true for the cases of 
bilateral aid and NGOs. The exploitation model gives however a partial view of what determines the sharing of 
burdens. To understand burden sharing across countries fully one needs to take account of the most dominant 
religions in a country, the pro-foreign aid stance of a government and the government size. Donor countries are 
not much affected in their funding behavior by the state of development of the least developed countries. 
 
* For the purposes of the present paper, data produced within the framework of the UNFPA/UNAIDS/NIDI 
Resource Flows project have been used (see www.resourceflows.org.). The author wishes to stress that the views 
expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of UNFPA or UNAIDS. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What determines the levels of donor government funding in matters of global collective 
action? The standard retort of a social scientist would be ‘altruism’, donors care about the 
welfare of those living in less fortunate circumstances. Informed insiders, like development 
policy watchers and public choice theorists (cf. Schraeder et al., 1998; Alesina and Dollar, 
2000), would be more hesitant in providing the textbook answer. The answer to this question 
is not as straightforward as it might seem from the outside because in cases of clear collective 
action, group processes are at work which affect individual donor behavior. Free riding on the 
efforts of others is thereby not reserved for the study of individual pursuits, it can also be a 
behavioral response of governments who make some joint effort to provide a global public 
good, like the war on terrorism or as in the case of the global effort to reduce poverty as 
spelled out in the Millenium Development Goals. 
In this paper the issue of global collective action will be examined for a specific area 
which is part of the efforts surrounding the Millenium Development Goals, viz. efforts to 
make reproductive health and HIV/AIDS programs widely accessible, as agreed at the 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in the summer of 
1994.1 The intentions of international governments that were involved in drawing up the so-
called ICPD Programme of action were quite clear. The donor governments promised to 
finance one third of the total amount of resource flows that are tied to population activities in 
developing countries. According to ICPD projections, reproductive health costs in developing 
countries will likely total 17 billion US dollars in the year 2000 and 21.7 billion US dollars in 
2015. So far the contributions by both donor and recipient countries (public and private 
sector) have lagged far behind these ambitions (cf. Potts et al. 1998, Van Dalen and Reuser, 
2005). And the gap between stated ambitions and actual contributions makes one wonder 
what’s behind the lack of funds. 
The moral hazard problems tied to global collective action problems are an important 
candidate for resolving some of the mysteries why donor countries do not live up to their 
promises or financial pledges (cf. Bulir and Hamann, 2004). The problem which the 
participants of the Cairo Conference faced, and still face, is a problem not unlike many other 
foreign aid programs. Population assistance programs pose a collective action problem for the 
international community as fertility developments in developing countries may pose a tragedy 
of the commons and the HIV/AIDS pandemic shows that a disease will not stop at the border 
and threaten the health status of everyone. Many developing nations must rely on other 
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nations to provide them with resources and cash to finance population activities, like family 
planning, investments in reproductive health, AIDS programs and basic research. By 
increasing the welfare of a recipient country, foreign aid serves as a public good, i.e. an input 
that produces an output that is both non-excludable and non-rival to all nations interested in 
the well-being of the recipient. For instance, if the United States helps India and the United 
Kingdom is also interested in the well being of India it can free ride on the foreign aid efforts 
of the United States. 
A mechanism which offers an explanation for this collective action failure has been 
described by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) and summed up in their ‘exploitation hypothesis’. 
Olson and Zeckhauser focused mainly on the financing of military strategic alliances, such as 
the NATO. Their theory can however be applied to other issues which share this problem and 
foreign aid is one of them. Essentially their thesis boils down to the following more formal 
point: if foreign aid is untied, aggregate aid to a recipient represents a fungible resource, since 
the source of the contribution is immaterial. The recipient’s welfare depends then on the sum 
of aid received from others. Sub-optimality in the supply of foreign aid is then to be expected. 
E.g., suppose that the recipient’s welfare affects the welfare of the would-be donors in a 
positive manner, then donor contributions will be positively related to the donor’s income. 
Wealthier nations would have a greater desire to contribute aid and so wealthier nations will 
also bear a larger share of the burden than less well-off nations. In other words, some small 
country will exploit the benevolence of large countries. Foreign aid would then be sub-
optimal and some supranational action should be initiated to correct this failure. The manner 
in which foreign aid is corrected at the supranational level is however crucial as policy 
initiatives at this level may result in no effect whatsoever if the neutrality theorem applies. If 
an international agency like UNAIDS or UNFPA supplements a recipient’s foreign aid from 
revenues collected from donor nations, then foreign aid at the supranational level would 
simply crowd out voluntary foreign aid from donors on a dollar-for-dollar basis (see Sandler, 
1992). It remains however an empirical question whether these conditions apply to specific 
foreign aid problems. 
This paper is an empirical examination of the collective action choices made by donors 
in giving aid to reproductive health activities as envisioned in the ICPD Programme of action. 
The central question is what determines the sharing of burdens in aid programs? The focus is 
exclusively turned towards the behavior of donor OECD countries in their choice and 
financial support of aid channels. I will focus on three different channels through which 
reproductive health aid flows to developing countries: multilateral organizations (like the UN 
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organizations UNFPA and UNAIDS), non-governmental organizations (like Marie Stopes 
International and International Planned Parenthood Federation), and bilateral aid 
(governments of developed countries). The three channels of aid for reproductive health 
assistance differ with respect to the public nature of aid flows. The multilateral aid 
organizations provide a supranational level of coordination and resembles more closely the 
pure collective action problem of providing a global public good. The other channels provide 
services which offer both country-specific (or private) and global public benefits, although 
again the issues of collective action arise again in this specific context, as the OECD/DAC 
members promised in 1994 to provide adequate funds according to specific global targets and 
all countries are therefore bound to live up to that promise. The channels through which aid 
flows were no matter of deliberation at the Cairo conference. 
In order to explore the question we will make use of funding data which the ‘resource 
flows’ project group of UNFPA/UNAIDS/NIDI collects. The data includes information on the 
channels, bilateral, multilateral or non-governmental and covers the period from 1982 to 
2002. The set-up of the paper is as follows. First, some stylized facts of burden sharing in the 
case of reproductive health and HIV/AIDS assistance are presented (section 2), to be followed 
by a model of donor behavior (section 3) which might shed some light on the driving forces 
behind donor behavior.  In section 4 the theory of donor behavior is put to the test to see 
which factors in practice are relevant in explaining the stylized facts. Section 5 concludes with 
some interpretations and implications of the findings. 
 
2. Some stylized facts of burden sharing 
Before we entertain some thoughts on the behavior of donor governments I will present some 
facts and figures on the level and structure of funds for reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. 
To get an overview how funding has shifted we present in Figure 1 the aggregate of primary 
funds generated by donor countries over the period 1973-2002. In 2002 the total of funds 
generated by OECD/DAC governments is 2.3 billion US dollars. Over this period a number of 
events as well as changing views of the population problem have affected funding from donor 
countries. According to Schindlmayr (2004) one of the factors that account for historical 
funding trends from primary donors is the occurrence of international population conferences. 
His reading of the donor funding developments is that donor governments appear to make a 
special effort to increase funding shortly before and during conference years. 
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Figure 1: Level of primary funds population and HIV/AIDS activities (in million US 
dollars), 1973-2002 
 
Source: UNFPA/UNAIDS/NIDI 
 
 
However, funding levels decline in the subsequent years when attention fades away for the 
population cause. The two important conferences in the period under consideration are the 
1984 Mexico City Conference and the 1994 International Conference on Population and 
Development in Cairo. The latter conference has been marked by some as a fundamental shift 
in population assistance programs or family planning. However, it remains difficult to 
disentangle causality in this specific case because the upward shift in funding is in part a 
consequence of the fact that in 1994 the definition of population assistance was broadened to 
include reproductive health programs (Bulatao, 1998).2 From the year 1996 onwards data 
have been collected on a more disaggregated level and as one see from Table 1 that the funds 
generated by OECD/DAC governments are the most important contributors, to be followed at 
some distance by private foundations, a group of donors which is dominated by funding from 
the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation. The most dominant trend in these post-Cairo years is 
the focus on HIV/AIDS, not in the least triggered by the looming AIDS pandemic. 
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Table 1: Level of primary funds, various donor types (in million current US dollars) 
Year OECD/DAC 
government 
Private 
foundations 
Bank Grants 
development banks
UN system NGO Total funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Sum (1) to (5)
1996 1369.1 92.4 7.8 18.0 48.1 1535.4 
1997 1529.9 62.8 9.1 49.1 42.9 1693.8 
1998 1538.8 72.5 10.4 34.5 51.1 1707.3 
1999 1411.1 175.6 9.2 31.4 64.1 1691.4 
2000 1597.7 250.7 0.8 77.3 48.1 1974.6 
2001 1719.7 201.6 3.2 96.1 39.1 2059.7 
2002 2313.9 460.1 2.0 31.4 70.3 2877.7 
 
Source: Van Dalen and Reuser (2005) 
 
 
To shed some light on the central issue of this paper – burden sharing - Table 2 presents the 
relative shares of OECD/DAC countries in population and HIV/AIDS activities by aid 
channel per country and Figure 2 presents the allocation of population aid by aid channel in 
the aggregate.  
 
Figure 2: Allocation of population and HIV/AIDS assistance across aid organization 
types, 1982-2003 
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Bilateral channel includes funds that flow directly from donor governments to recipient 
country governments. The multilateral channel includes general funds that are not earmarked 
for specific population activities, which multilateral organizations receive from donor 
governments. The NGO channel comprises funds from foundations and general contributions 
to NGOs active in the field of population and bilateral expenditures for specific population 
activities that are executed by NGOs (UNFPA, 2001). The most striking aspect of Figure 2 is 
the fact that funding through NGOs is the dominant organizational form since 1996, whereas 
the funds allocated through multilateral organizations has steadily declined from 40 percent in 
1982 to 24 percent in 2002.  
In Table 2 one can see which country is responsible for this switch. The United States 
is the most dominant party in the case of reproductive health and HIV/AIDS funding (cf. Van 
Dalen and Reuser, 2005) and this simple observation affects the aggregate outcomes to a large 
extent. As one can see from Table 2 the US has switched from bilateral funding (from a share 
of 71 percent in 1983-94 to a share of 42 percent in1995-2002) to funding through NGOs 
(increasing its share from 69 percent to 76 percent). However, each country seems to tell a 
different story. E.g., Germany has increased its world-wide share in bilateral funding by 10 
percentage points (over the two decades), Japan has decreased its share in multilateral funding 
with almost 8 percentage points; this decrease is almost neutralized by the funding efforts of 
the Netherlands. The Netherlands is the only country which has increased its funds for all 
channels, but by and large its interests focus on multilateral agencies and despite its size it is 
the number one financier of multilateral agencies in population and HIV/AIDS. 
What is clear from examining the divergence and development in these aggregate figures 
is that the sample of countries is split between a slight majority (12 countries) which gives 
less than their fair share based on GDP, while a slight minority (9 countries) are willing to 
give more than their fair share to fund reproductive health activities. Another stylized fact 
which needs some explanation is the fact that over time two third of the sample of countries 
raised their aid share over time, while a third has decreased its share. 
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Table 2: Relative shares of donor countries in population activities and GDP 
(percentages), 1983-2002 
 Total primary funds Multilateral agencies  NGO funding Bilateral funds Nominal GDP 
Australia      
  1983-1994 0.86 1.10 0.43 1.09 1.85 
  1995-2002 1.93 1.44 0.97 3.82 1.70 
  1983-2002 1.29 1.24 0.65 2.18 1.79 
Austria      
  1983-1994 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.89 
  1995-2002 0.09 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.91 
  1983-2002 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.90 
Belgium      
  1983-1994 0.24 0.55 0.02 0.14 1.07 
  1995-2002 0.90 1.93 0.22 0.84 1.08 
  1983-2002 0.50 1.11 0.10 0.42 1.07 
Canada      
  1983-1994 4.67 5.50 3.95 4.52 3.38 
  1995-2002 2.53 3.83 1.78 2.24 2.79 
  1983-2002 3.81 4.83 3.08 3.61 3.15 
Denmark      
  1983-1994 2.91 6.51 2.09 0.03 0.74 
  1995-2002 3.51 8.26 2.31 0.45 0.74 
  1983-2002 3.15 7.21 2.17 0.20 0.74 
Finland      
  1983-1994 1.84 4.85 0.17 0.42 0.64 
  1995-2002 1.39 3.56 0.32 0.65 0.54 
  1983-2002 1.66 4.33 0.23 0.51 0.60 
France      
  1983-1994 0.53 0.33 1.04 0.17 6.63 
  1995-2002 1.29 0.89 1.24 1.78 6.19 
  1983-2002 0.83 0.55 1.12 0.81 6.45 
Germany      
  1983-1994 6.64 10.61 1.96 7.02 9.28 
  1995-2002 7.63 6.84 1.12 17.83 9.14 
  1983-2002 7.03 9.10 1.63 11.34 9.22 
Ireland      
  1983-1994 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.27 
  1995-2002 0.28 0.30 0.04 0.39 0.39 
  1983-2002 0.24 0.28 0.04 0.35 0.37 
Italy      
  1983-1994 0.81 2.16 0.11 0.09 5.59 
  1995-2002 0.76 1.56 0.13 0.89 4.98 
  1983-2002 0.79 1.92 0.12 0.41 5.35 
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Japan      
  1983-1994 9.95 21.89 4.15 3.40 18.85 
  1995-2002 7.26 14.21 4.27 4.50 19.26 
  1983-2002 8.88 18.82 4.20 3.84 19.01 
Luxembourg      
  1983-1994 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.07 
  1995-2002 0.27 0.25 0.04 0.67 0.08 
  1983-2002 0.23 0.23 0.03 0.54 0.08 
Netherlands      
  1983-1994 4.73 11.37 1.15 1.47 1.66 
  1995-2002 8.46 18.94 2.18 6.51 1.71 
  1983-2002 6.22 14.40 1.56 3.48 1.68 
New Zealand      
  1983-1994 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.26 
  1995-2002 0.13 0.25 0.14 0.01 0.25 
  1983-2002 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.26 
Norway      
  1983-1994 6.56 11.04 3.25 5.40 0.67 
  1995-2002 3.77 10.09 1.61 0.42 0.70 
  1983-2002 5.44 10.66 2.59 3.40 0.68 
Portugal      
  1983-1994 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.44 
  1995-2002 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.48 
  1983-2002 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.48 
Spain      
  1983-1994 0.07 0.21 0.00 0.00 2.53 
  1995-2002 0.44 0.56 0.03 0.99 2.56 
  1983-2002 0.36 0.49 0.02 0.79 2.55 
Sweden      
  1983-1994 5.20 8.04 6.55 0.89 1.27 
  1995-2002 3.99 6.46 2.31 3.86 1.06 
  1983-2002 4.72 7.40 4.86 2.08 1.19 
Switzerland      
  1983-1994 0.76 2.14 0.07 0.04 1.24 
  1995-2002 1.20 2.61 0.43 0.82 1.15 
  1983-2002 0.96 2.39 0.22 0.37 1.20 
UK      
  1983-1994 5.31 6.14 5.67 4.29 5.39 
  1995-2002 7.79 8.95 4.90 11.10 5.90 
  1983-2002 6.30 7.27 5.36 7.01 5.59 
USA      
  1983-1994 48.83 7.44 69.31 71.00 37.44 
  1995-2002 46.43 8.80 75.96 42.13 38.41 
  1983-2002 47.87 7.98 71.97 59.45 37.82 
 
 9
3. Theory of Donor Behavior 
 
To understand the stylized facts one has try to see donor behavior as being driven by two 
factors: (1) the internal driving forces of a donor, irrespective of what others give; and (2) the 
strategic interaction forces that play a role in financing or providing public goods. It is the 
latter aspect which needs some further exposition. Thinking about donor behavior with 
respect to the ICPD agenda revolves essentially around the mechanisms of collective action. 
The question that concerns donor governments is not a novel issue as it turns on the 
fundamental problem of the theory of international collective action (Olson and Zeckhauser, 
1966) where a global collective good has to be financed by contributions of the community. 
Olson and Zeckhauser focused mainly on the financing of a military strategic alliance, such as 
NATO. The main conclusion was that due to specific externalities tied to such an alliance big 
countries, such as the US, contributed disproportionately (in terms of GDP) compared to the 
smaller countries. 
Their theory can easily be applied to the questions of foreign aid as there are numerous 
multilateral organizations, particularly within the UN-system, which have been established to 
accommodate the needs of the developing world. In this paper we want to focus on the 
question of foreign aid directed at family planning and reproductive health programs. We 
assume that each and every OECD/DAC member cares about the level of welfare in the least 
developed countries.3 In order to cope with the problem of widespread poverty donor 
countries form an alliance – the Cairo conference members - which promises to finance a 
public good Q, which in our case boils down to a level of public (reproductive) health care. 
Each of the n members of the alliance allocates part of its national income I to private goods yi 
and a contribution to the global public good Q: qi. Let’s assume for the sake of the argument 
that all decisions are made by the national government (often the ministry of foreign affairs). 
The maximization problem of the government can then be represented as the objective of 
maximizing national welfare Ui: 
 
),,( TQqyUU i
iiii
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where: 
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The threat variable T in this case amounts to the poverty or welfare in general in the 
developing world. The threat being that increasing income inequality in the world will 
reinforce migration tendencies or it will put pressure on OECD/DAC countries to provide 
more development assistance, just like the Millennium Development Goals entices OECD 
countries to increase development assistance to slash poverty rates by half by the year 2015. 
The threat is in this set-up common to all countries although each and every member can 
interpret the threat differently. In general one can say that when poverty rises in the 
developing world this will lead to a decrease in welfare (i.e. ∂Ui/∂T < 0). In maximizing the 
welfare objective donor governments have to obey their budget constraint: 
 
iii pqyI +=           (3) 
 
where the private good is the numéraire and hence its price is 1 and the price of the health 
care package needed to finance activities in, e.g., family planning, reproductive health care 
and HIV/AIDS is p. To simplify matters we assume that each donor faces the same price, 
hence there can be no comparative advantage in providing aid. The general insight from this 
particular type of collective action problem is that the Nash level of foreign aid is less than the 
Pareto efficient level of aid. In other words, the ‘market’ for foreign aid fails in a 
decentralized setting. In the Nash equilibrium the donor government chooses a level of 
spending on foreign aid and private goods subject to its budget constraint and given the best 
response level of other allies, Q-i. The reaction function of donor i can therefore be written as: 
 
),,,( TQIpqq i
iii
−=          (4) 
 
In order to produce the Pareto-efficient outcome each and every ally should choose a level of 
foreign aid so that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between aid and the private 
good equals the price of aid p. This would be the solution of a global decision maker who 
could oversee the willingness of every participant to contribute to the global public good. In 
the Nash case each donor equates its own marginal rate of substitution with the price of 
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population aid and thereby donates too few resources. The latter insight is particularly 
relevant in the context of ICPD agenda.  
The model spelled out above sheds some light on the choice of funding in the case of a 
strategic alliance and the ideal organization to circumvent the ‘market failures’ of giving 
would be to centralize all donor decisions. A multilateral organization would be the practical 
translation that comes close to this ideal. Of course, with the construction of a multilateral 
organization new organizational problems and costs arise which may well counter the benefits 
of centralization. In the case of foreign aid for reproductive health or HIV/AIDS, governments 
can choose between two other types of aid channels: (i) aid can be directed to Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or (ii) governments can use bilateral aid channels and 
hence transfer money directly to national governments which in their view are in need of aid. 
All channels differ with respect to the publicness of benefits and the publicness in decision 
making (see Kaul and Mendoza, 2003). The tacit assumption made in the above model of 
strategic alliances is that every contributor to a multilateral organization is in agreement with 
the allocation of funds to various reproductive health categories, or how to distribute the 
benefits of aid to all those concerned. This may be a major reason for some countries dislike 
multilateral organizations and prefer bilateral aid or NGOs with a profile that coincides with 
their preferences. In case a country does not want to depend on the efforts of others – and in 
other words, completely erode the possibilities for free riding in finance – bilateral aid is the 
option which allows some sovereignty. The response level of other allies, Q-i is therefore by 
definition irrelevant for choosing the level of funding: ∂qi/∂Q-i = 0. 
The choice for a particular NGO is a case in between multilateral organization and 
bilateral aid as one can benefit from the economies of scale, internalized by the NGO, and still 
choose an organization that fits the profile or preferences of the donor. Most donors may not 
have the funds to execute bilateral programs and can therefore not neglect the efforts of others 
if they want to achieve goals that are in line with the agenda set by the participants of the 
Cairo conference. They are dependent on others because of their small size and they have to 
take into account the nature of the aggregation technologies which apply to specific public 
goods (Sandler and Arce, 2002).4 In the production of the public good it matters whether we 
are dealing with a simple summation technology – in which each unit contributed to a public 
good adds identically and additively to the overall level available to all (the default 
assumption made in the above model). However, one would expect in the case of reproductive 
health a best shot technology – the global public good is determined by the largest 
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contribution among participating countries; or a weakest link technology – the smallest 
contribution determines the quantity of the public good. 
 
4. Putting the Theory to the Test 
 
The previous model highlights the elements which can be relevant in explaining the behavior 
of a typical donor government and the question of sharing the burden. To highlight the most 
important driving forces in sharing the burden, the following equation is estimated by means 
of dynamic panel estimation: 
 
itijtij
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it
it XTQ
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The share of funds Dit in the total of funds is explained four type of variables (1) ability to 
pay, the first term on the right-hand side; (2) the contributions made by others Q-i; (3) a threat 
variable Tit; and (4) the characteristics of the donor country (summed up by j variables Xijt)5, 
to approximate (country-)specific preferences or technologies in the giving of aid. It is 
assumed that every country faces the same price of offering reproductive health aid and hence 
this variable is not included as an explanatory variable. 
 
Data 
To explain the behavior of donors in funding over time we have pooled the experiences of the 
21 countries and employed the method of dynamic panel estimation.6 The panel is not 
balanced as not every country has observations for the period 1982-2002. To be specific, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal are latecomers to the pool of donors and for 
specific aid channels like bilateral aid and NGO some countries the years in which no aid is 
provided are left out of our sample. Only non-negative numbers are used to examine donor 
behavior. The descriptive statistics are presented for the entire sample of countries in Table 3. 
Among the most important potential explanatory factors are income and income 
distribution of a country, the pro-foreign assistance stance of some countries as measured by 
the share of GDP allocated to official development assistance (ODA, excluding population 
assistance), the donor expenditures of other countries (lagged with one period), the business 
cycle state of an economy as measured by the level of unemployment, the threat of a widening 
gap in human development (as approximated by the Human Development Index), the 
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influence of particular religions in a country, and the political ideology of the ruling 
government (as collected by Beck et al. 2001). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, 1983-2002 
Variable Obsa Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Group shares within OECD/DAC      
Total primary funds 293 0.059 0.112 0.000b 0.615 
Bilateral 220 0.080 0.172 0.000b 0.827 
Multilateral 286 0.058 0.062 0.000b 0.290 
NGO 235 0.076 0.185 0.000b 0.805 
GDP 293 0.056 0.094 0.001 0.460 
Average share t-1:      
Others total primary funds 293 0.049 0.010 0.032 0.076 
Others bilateral 220 0.016 0.004 0.004 0.030 
Others multilateral 286 0.016 0.003 0.011 0.029 
Others NGO 235 0.017 0.006 0.006 0.030 
Level of:      
Total Primary funds 293 55817.3 107801.1 124.8 667086.0 
Bilateral 220 23645.6 47708.3 9.1 266834.4 
Multilateral 286 17769.1 19081.8 24.2 116400.9 
NGO 235 25844.5 70783.6 12.1 465163.4 
      
GDP level (1995 prices) 293 1175124 1884571 17826.6 8955100 
ODAGDP (excl. Population funds) % 293 0.444 0.254 0.072 1.183 
HDI donor i 293 0.918 0.014 0.882 0.971 
HDI LDC 293 0.401 0.026 0.358 0.445 
GDP per capita (1995 prices) 293 25721.8 7805.8 11119.3 58464.2 
Gini coefficient 293 29.380 4.347 24.7 36.8 
Unemployment (%) 293 7.630 3.709 1.6 23.9 
Government size (government 
consumption/GDP) 
293 20.624 3.544 13.3 29.4 
Presence left wing government 293 0.430 0.496 0 1 
EU-member 293 0.532 0.500 0 1 
Catholic religion among top 2 religion 293 0.693 0.462 0 1 
Lutheran religion among top 2 religion 293 0.246 0.431 0 1 
Protestant religion among top 2 religion 293 0.625 0.485 0 1 
 
(a) The sample is not balanced and the number of observations varies per aid channel and in this table the 
statistics are presented in line with the outcomes of Table 4b and 5. 
(b) These values are positive, but extremely small. 
 
 
The explanatory variables come from different sources. The level of GDP (total and per 
capita), Official Development Assistance (excluding population assistance, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP), government size (as measured by general government final consumption 
expenditure as percentage of GDP), unemployment rate (as percentage of labor force) are all 
extracted from the World Bank Development Indicators (edition 2004). The ODA variable is 
corrected for the influence of population aid by subtracting funds to population and AIDS 
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programs from the level of ODA. The Human Development Index is a weighted average of 
income, literacy and life expectancy, with weights as described in Human Development 
Reports of the UN (WHO, 2004), but with data from the World Development Indicators. The 
income inequality measures (i.c. Gini indices) come from the Luxembourg Income Study 
which reports at irregular intervals the state of income inequality in a host of OECD 
countries.7 All the previously stated variables are defined in logarithmic form so the relevant 
coefficients can be more easily interpreted as elasticities. The religion dummies apply to the 
presence of (Roman) Catholic, Lutheran or Protestant religion belonging to the two most 
dominant religions in each country as registered by UNESCO (2000).8 Finally, we have 
included membership of the European Union as an explanatory dummy because we expect 
that some countries will take account of the fact that the European Union is a separate 
contributor to the ICPD agenda and changes in donor funding from the EU can have some 
effect on funding behavior of individual EU members. To gauge the effect of the Mexico City 
Policy of the United States we use two types of dummy variables, which are explained at the 
appropriate point in the text.  
 
Sharing of burdens 
The standard measure to reflect on the burden-sharing capacity of a donor country is the share 
of GDP which is devoted to financing population activities as envisioned in the Programme of 
action. Olsen and Zeckhauser (1966) were the first to check whether there exist in the practice 
of the NATO some form of ‘exploitation’ by the small countries of the large countries within 
a defense alliance. The Olson and Zeckhauser test is restricted to within-ally burden sharing 
(measured as the contribution to collective action in relation to the contributor’s ability to 
pay). As pointed out by Sandler and Hartley (2001) it would be more appropriate to test to the 
idea of burden sharing by using an among-ally indicator. Such a measure would boil down to 
the contributor’s share of the total contribution by all members, as shown in Table 2.The 
following null hypothesis is relevant: each donor gives money that is equal to its share in total 
GDP of all donors. To the test the burden sharing hypothesis we follow the approach of 
Addison et al. (2004) who examined burden sharing in the case of multilateral foreign aid and 
found some traces of  ‘reverse exploitation’: the small countries support multilateral agencies 
disproportionately. The ability to pay is the starting point for the estimation exercise, but 
given the fact that is difficult to really pin down the case of exploitation the focus in this 
section will be on shedding light on revealed burden sharing in terms of the ability to pay as 
well as other factors. The ability to pay is approximated by the share of GDP in the group of 
 15
OECD/DAC countries. If each and every country carries the burden of financing a pure public 
good in line with its ability to pay, the coefficient α (estimated in equation 5) would be equal 
to one and if we assume that everyone has the same capabilities and preferences the effect of 
other variables would be negligible. The ‘exploitation hypothesis’ would be a case of α > 1, 
and ‘reverse exploitation’ would, of course, boil down to the case of α < 1. Casual 
observation of Table 2 gives the impression that the case of ‘fair’ burden sharing (α = 1) is 
rarely the case: on an aggregate scale twelve countries give less than their income share and 
nine give more than their income share. However, within the various aid channels the picture 
is far more varied and less clear-cut. Estimating a naive version of equation (5) would give a 
rough idea of how burdens are shared in the world (see Table 4a). 
 
Table 4a: Explaining Burden Sharing in Reproductive Health Programs, by Aid 
Channels a, 1983-2002 
 Share aid of country i in the total aid flow: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total of 
primary funds 
Multilateral NGO funding Bilateral funding
Income     
Share GDP 0.94** 
(0.05) 
0.77** 
(0.06) 
0.95** 
(0.06) 
0.98** 
(0.11) 
Constant -0.71** 
(0.20) 
-1.07** 
(0.28) 
-1.08** 
(0.35) 
-0.45 
(0.44) 
Loglikelihood -129.76 -138.17 -254.66 -314.84 
N 375 383 304 285 
 
(a) FGLS regression with country-specific AR(1) processes and controlling for heteroskedasticity. Standard 
errors are between brackets below the coefficients, * * denotes significance at < 1% level. 
 
 
The estimation results clearly demonstrate that ‘large’ countries are exploiting the ‘small’ 
countries, although it must be said that the coefficients for α are close to one in the case of 
NGO funding and bilateral aid. In short, for the latter two categories one must conclude that 
burdens are shared more or less in line with one’s ability to pay. Of course, the question is 
whether this naive picture is robust.  
The (reverse) ‘exploitation’ interpretation would be applicable if the public good, i.c. 
reproductive health care, would be a pure global public good. As mentioned before, the 
assumption of a global public good would be valid if there are no individual-specific side 
benefits to the provision of foreign aid. In that respect, the term ‘exploitation’ is something of  
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Table 4b: Explaining Burden Sharing in Reproductive Health Programs, by Aid 
Channels, 1983-2002 
 Share aid of country i in the total aid flow: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total of 
primary funds 
Multilateral NGO funding Bilateral funding
Income and state 
business cycle 
    
Share GDP 1.23** 
(0.05) 
0.97** 
(0.04) 
1.17** 
(0.05) 
1.29** 
(0.08) 
GDP per capita 1.30** 
(0.41) 
1.06** 
(0.29) 
1.47** 
(0.34) 
0.55 
(0.58) 
Unemployment -0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.14) 
-0.19 
(0.24) 
Interdependency     
Average share 
others (t-1) 
0.36* 
(0.16) 
-0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
US Mexico City 
Policy 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.20 
(0.12) 
Threat     
Gap in HDI -1.05 
(0.87) 
-2.29** 
(0.78) 
0.19 
(1.17) 
0.29 
(1.77) 
Country 
characteristics 
    
ODA/GDP (excl. 
population funds) 
0.25* 
(0.12) 
0.64** 
(0.13) 
1.25** 
(0.18) 
0.28 
(0.20) 
Left wing 
executive 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
-0.25 
(0.14) 
Income inequality 2.39** 
(0.72) 
0.60 
(0.68) 
8.29** 
(0.84) 
1.15 
(1.17) 
Government size 1.49** 
(0.49) 
1.67** 
(0.46) 
2.13** 
(0.63) 
0.27 
(0.81) 
Catholic -0.46** 
(0.14) 
-0.86** 
(0.15) 
0.00 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.27) 
Lutheran 3.59** 
(0.33) 
2.03** 
(0.36) 
3.87** 
(0.37) 
2.68** 
(0.47) 
Protestant 2.21** 
(0.28) 
1.30** 
(0.30) 
2.34** 
(0.24) 
2.23** 
(0.35) 
EU-member -0.32** 
(0.11) 
-0.32** 
(0.10) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
0.38 
(0.22) 
Constant -24.21** 
(7.45) 
-15.54** 
(5.74) 
-50.37** 
(6.77) 
-11.29 
(11.33) 
Loglikelihood -86.76 -101.11 -151.60 -225.31 
N 293 286 235 220 
 
(a) FGLS regression with country-specific AR(1) processes and controlling for heteroskedasticity. Standard 
errors are between brackets below the coefficients, ** denotes significance at < 1% level; and * denotes 
significance at < 5 % level. 
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a misnomer because it does not necessarily signify exploitation of the big by the small 
countries. It could very well be the case that governments act in accordance with the principle 
of comparative advantages or economies of scale or they derive benefits from ‘giving’ based 
on ideological preferences or religious principles, hence making the inclusion of variables 
which control for such characteristics necessary. Table 4b gives a  more complete picture by 
not only estimating the GDP share but also the interaction with other countries, the threat of 
poverty, and the individual characteristics which include not only preferences about the 
income inequality, and the political ideology of the ruling government. 
Table 4b presents a picture that differs markedly from the naïve model of Table 4a. 
The results show unambiguously that large countries predominantly choose the channels of 
NGOs and bilateral aid. Small countries favor the multilateral organizations but the parameter 
α  is close to one and certainly not so small as the parameter presented in Table 4a. The latter 
finding is in line with what Addison et al. (2004) report who reviewed the exploitation 
hypothesis for multilateral aid agencies. They find clear signs of ‘reverse exploitation’, where 
donor governments of small economies carry a disproportionately large share of the funding 
burdens of multilateral agencies. However, the reverse exploitation hypothesis does not give 
an accurate picture when they focus on UN and EC agencies: the parameter α  is close to one. 
In that respect, their specific findings are in line with the present study. 
 
Interaction with others 
The presence of other donors can have an effect on behavior it remains an open question in 
which direction the interaction affects donations. There is a literature on public goods 
experiments (cf. Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004) in which individual 
donations are positively affected by what others give, as long as these donations are ‘in the 
open’. Donors value how their contribution relates to some ‘fair’ standard, which is in turn 
related to what others give. However, in the context of a public good one can also expect a 
negative sign as donors could possibly care only about the level of public good Q and when 
someone else already funds the largest part of this production costs, the donor can withhold 
(part) of the intended funds. In other words: ∂qi/∂Q-i < 0. Table 4b clearly shows that none of 
these effects are clearly present in the donor statistics and there is only one conclusion 
possible: donor countries are not affected by what others give. 
 Another variable which measures interaction is an element that is specific to the policy 
context of reproductive health, viz. the Mexico City Policy of the US or as it is called by some 
the Global Gag Rule. This policy - initiated by President Ronald Reagan, and applied also by 
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presidents Bush senor and junior – boils down to the policy measure to deny foreign 
organizations receiving U.S. family planning assistance the right to use their own, non-U.S. 
funds to either engage in any abortion-related public policy debates or perform legal 
abortions.9 To model this interaction a dummy variable is created with value 1 in the years in 
which the policy is applied and zero otherwise and only for the United States, for other 
countries the dummy variable is always zero.10 As one can see from Table 4b one cannot trace 
a discernable influence on the funding for the three channels. Of course, the effect we are 
testing is rather specific, but an alternative dummy variable approaching the Global Gag Rule 
– applying the rule that the dummy is 1 in ‘Gag years’ and zero otherwise, only for non-US 
countries - did not yield a different conclusion. 
 
Threats of poverty 
To test for the fact that donor behavior is induced by the threat of world-wide poverty, the gap 
in human development between the donor country and the group of least developed countries 
is used as a proxy variable. A remarkable result is that the gap does not affect NGO funding 
or bilateral aid and it affects multilateral funding in a negative way. The fact that the growing 
gap affects multilateral funding and not the other channels may a result of the fact that 
funding towards multilateral organizations is part of long-standing national agreements 
whereas the funding on a bilateral base or towards NGOs is of a more discretionary nature. 
Hence a move away from multilateral aid towards aid which a donor can control more on a 
year-to-year base could potentially explain the counterintuitive effects in Table 4b. 
 
Country characteristics 
There are, of course, sound reasons for this form of specialization across aid categories – 
small countries support multilateral aid organizations more than bilateral aid projects and the 
situation is completely the reverse for large countries - to come about since there can be 
substantial economies of scale in making aid work. Using multilateral organizations as the 
main channel of aid for small countries makes sense. But as we said before there can also be 
private benefits tied to specific donor options and the benefits are mostly tied to donor 
preferences. 
When we look at the estimation results of Table 4b we notice that a number of 
characteristics of the contributors to multilateral organizations stand out. The fact that 
organizations like UNFPA and UNAIDS benefit from rich, small countries with a large public 
sector and a good track record in providing ODA fits the description of top contributors well. 
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The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are known for their generous contributions 
to multilateral reproductive health organizations. 
However, the most noteworthy outcomes of the estimation results refer to the religious 
denomination of countries. As is known from research on private donations to churches and 
other charity goals (e.g. Iannaccone, 1998), differences between religions play a large role in 
the level of donations. Religion itself is a clear force in explaining the level of funds across 
countries. As one can see countries where Catholicism belongs to one of the top two religions 
in a country exerts a clear negative force with respect to donations to multilateral 
organizations. This negative sign can be explained because donors have to give up their 
discretionary power in allocating funds when they donate money to multilateral organizations. 
Given the strong convictions on issue of family planning (use of condoms, abortion etc.) of 
the Holy See it stands to reason that Catholic nations are hesitant or averse to this particular 
aid channel. 
However, if the Protestant or Lutheran religion belongs to one the dominant religions 
in the donor country this negative effect is counterbalanced or even overcompensated. 
However, we should be careful in putting too much weight on the religious factor and not 
confuse this element with a country characteristic. It may well be the case that a binding 
factor in giving development aid plays a dominant role that coincides with the religious 
dummy variables. It is well-known that the Scandinavian countries fund a relatively high 
share of ODA or population assistance and these countries happen to be dominated by the 
Lutheran religion. 
The fact that EU members are giving less to multilateral organizations is primarily a 
result of the fact that the EU as a separate entity also gives aid to reproductive health causes 
and naturally, an EU member can forego assistance. 
 
Resolving some puzzles 
The previous estimation results showed some anomalies and in this subsection I want to pay 
closer attention to some of these specific results and test the robustness of some of the 
previous results. Some of the results were perhaps tied to the fact that the explanatory variable 
amounted to a share and uniform shocks or dummy variables could not be used to explain 
changes in shares. As an alternative we will use the level of funds. Both the level of primary 
funds, split up by aid channels, and GDP are measured in constant US dollars (in 1995 
prices). The focus of attention will be on (1) the puzzling result of negative reaction to the 
threat variable, (2) the absence of an effect of the Mexico City Policy, and an extra subject 
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which could not be tested with the shares data is (3) the influence of population conferences 
on donor behavior. The equation (5) was re-estimated by this time with the dependent variable 
being the level of funding per aid channel and no longer will the share of income be used as 
an explanatory variable. Instead, the level of GDP is used as an explanatory variable. To 
control for the shift in definitions of reproductive health over the sample period, we have used 
an ICPD (dummy) variable which takes on value 1 from 1995 onwards and for the years till 
1995 it has the value zero. The estimation results are presented in Table 5. Before we discuss 
the empirical puzzles we just want to point out that indeed that ICPD era is marked by a 
significant shift in funds. And to comment on the most important driving force behind funding 
one can see clearly the tight relationship between national income development and the 
generation of primary funds. The total income elasticity is 1.3 and for the underlying aid 
channels it varies between 1.0 and 1.2. Essentially, this boils down to the message that 
“what’s good for the North, is good for the South”. E.g., one can say that a 1 percent increase 
in real GDP in the donor countries leads to a 1 percent increase in real primary funds flowing 
to multilateral organizations. 
 
Do donors care about developing world? 
The most puzzling element of Table 3a is perhaps the negative reaction of donor countries to 
the gap which exists between the developing world and the donor country itself, as measured 
by the Human Development Index, which is a composite variable consisting of the level of 
literacy, life expectancy and GDP per capita. To get a clear picture of what might be at stake 
the gap variable is split up by the HDI of both the donor and the HDI of the group of least 
developed countries. In doing so, one can get an idea of which of the two variables are 
important in driving the results. In Table 5 one can see that it is the human development 
inside the donor country which is driving the result and not the poor nations of the world. 
Only in the case of bilateral aid can one see some effect of HDI on donor funding: a decrease 
of HDI in the LDCs with one percent leads to an increase of bilateral funding with 6.6 
percent. Of course, increases in HDI on the donor side are not very likely to show large or 
sudden fluctuations over time. From 1983 to 2002 the average HDI for all OECD/DAC 
combined increased from 89.3 to 93.8. 
The fact that the circumstances of the poorest poor in the world affect donations on a 
bilateral level is to an extent understandable as this aid channel offers governments some 
discretionary power to do good. With multilateral organizations and NGOs this level of  
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Table 5: Explaining Level of Reproductive Health Funds, by Aid Channels, 1983-2002 
 Level of aid of country i in: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total of 
primary funds 
Multilateral NGO funding Bilateral funding
Income and  state 
business cycle 
    
GDP level 1.34** 
(0.06) 
1.01** 
(0.04) 
1.23** 
(0.05) 
1.20** 
(0.08) 
Unemployment -0.23* 
(0.10) 
-0.27** 
(0.10) 
-0.35* 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
Interdependency     
US Mexico City 
Policy 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
Average share 
others (t-1) 
0.19 
(0.19) 
-0.09 
(0.21) 
-0.07 
(0.18) 
-0.30 
(0.24) 
Threat     
HDI in LDCs -0.22 
(1.20) 
0.66 
(1.00) 
-2.42 
(1.57) 
-6.90** 
(2.58) 
HDI of donor i 9.93 
(6.37) 
14.03** 
(4.94) 
24.19** 
(6.38) 
37.25** 
(10.51) 
Country 
characteristics 
    
ODA/GDP (excl. 
Population funds  
0.26* 
(0.13) 
0.59** 
(0.13) 
1.06** 
(0.19) 
0.36 
(0.24) 
Left wing 
government 
-0.11 
(0.06) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
Income inequality 1.59* 
(0.67) 
-0.09 
(0.60) 
7.52** 
(0.79) 
1.88 
(1.01) 
Government size 1.53** 
(0.47) 
1.97** 
(0.49) 
2.61** 
(0.64) 
0.24 
(0.80) 
Catholic -0.53** 
(0.17) 
-1.06** 
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.05 
(0.25) 
Lutheran 3.76** 
(0.33) 
2.09** 
(0.34) 
3.89** 
(0.40) 
3.01** 
(0.45) 
Protestant 2.17** 
(0.20) 
1.27** 
(0.26) 
2.26** 
(0.26) 
2.56** 
(0.30) 
EU-member -0.33** 
(0.13) 
-0.38** 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.58* 
(0.27) 
ICPD-dummy 0.48** 
(0.11) 
0.43** 
(0.10) 
0.37* 
(0.15) 
0.80** 
(0.25) 
Population 
conferences 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
Constant -35.99** 
(3.57) 
-21.79** 
(3.36) 
-59.19** 
(4.03) 
-37.89** 
(5.00) 
Loglikelihood -100.08 -108.63 -157.75 -233.18 
N 293 286 235 220 
(a) FGLS regression with country-specific AR(1) processes and controlling for heteroskedasticity. Standard 
errors are between brackets below the coefficients, ** denotes significance at < 1% level; and * denotes 
significance at < 5 % level.  
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control is far more difficult to achieve and apparently others factors come into play in funding 
patterns towards these channels. 
 
Does the Mexico City Policy affect funding? 
The effects of the so-called Mexico City Policy of the United States could not be traced to the 
sharing of burdens. Re-estimation of the equation in levels does not change this conclusion. In 
Table 4b a dummy variable was used which had some variation over time for the US but not 
for the other countries. For a re-estimation of the model in levels a dummy variable is used 
which takes on the value 1 in ‘Gag years’ for every country in the sample, and is zero 
otherwise. The idea behind this formulation is that when the US increases its funding in a 
specific channel, the other countries will follow suit. The overall effect of the policy is 
negative, as expected, but not significantly different from zero. To test for the robustness of 
this conclusion two alternative types of dummies are used in which the dummy values for the 
US are zero and -1. None of these dummies changes the conclusion. Of course, the absence of 
an effect does not constitute a definite verdict on this policy as donor countries can well 
reshuffle the composition of their aid package in line with the intentions of the Global Gag 
Rule and still maintain a certain level of funds. The general conclusion of this section is that 
the Mexico City Policy does not affect the aggregate level of funding. 
 
Do conferences induce opportunism? 
To test the idea of opportunism in funding, I will put Schindlmayer’s claim (2004) to the test 
to see whether population conferences engender opportunistic funding behavior. An 
opportunist government would raise its level of funding in the year in which a population 
conference is held, when the focus of the developed world is on the developing world and 
decrease its funding afterwards. For this purpose we defined a dummy variable that takes on 
the value zero before time t (the year in which the population conference is held), has the 
value 1 at time t and for the three subsequent years the dummy value takes on value –1. The 
assumption is therefore that during the year in which a population conference is held 
governments raise their contributions and in the subsequent three years they decrease their 
contributions. The end result of this strategic behavior is that by shifting resources in time 
they ‘buy’ attention. The developing countries will, however, be on the losing side because it 
simply means that donors diminish their contributions in net terms. The results in Table 5 give 
an unambiguous verdict about the presence of opportunism: population conferences do not 
induce opportunistic funding behavior. To test the robustness of this result a number of 
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alternative dummy variables were tested capturing the manner in which opportunism could 
apply to funding behavior by varying the length of years in which funds are decreased after 
increasing in the year in which the population conference was held. The alternative dummy 
variables did not overturn the first result and yielded the one and only conclusion that 
conferences do not affect the timing of funds. There is however, a proviso that needs to be 
provided in stating this result. The present finding is not necessarily in contrast with the claim 
made by Schindlmayer (2004) because opportunism can exist for individual countries. The 
results of Table 5 only suggest that opportunism for the group of countries does not exist. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Development policy advocates often lament the unfortunate state of affairs that donors never 
fulfill their commitments. Their solution is often simple: donors should give more money and 
many a conference is designed to deliver this message. The present paper does not take this 
line of argument as it assumes that this particular type of market failure is not the exception 
but the rule. By considering the organization of public goods, and foreign aid in particular, 
and the specific nature of public goods one might be able to derive policy rules and ambitions 
which are credible. A situation of underfunding is likely to persist if the global management 
of aid does not recognize the principal-agent problems underlying collective action failures 
and if the driving forces of the giving of aid are not acknowledged. The present paper has 
brought to the fore what driving forces might be relevant in explaining the provision of 
foreign aid towards family planning and HIV/AIDS programs. 
The empirical results of this paper suggest that on an aggregated scale the small 
donors exploit the large donors, i.e. they contribute more than their fair share. On a more 
disaggregated scale it appears that small countries pay a relatively larger amount (so-called 
‘reverse exploitation’) in supporting multilateral organizations. However, the 
disproportionality is not that large and one could even state that each donor country pays more 
or less its fair share in supporting multilateral organizations. The ‘exploitation hypothesis’ is 
confirmed for other channels of aid: large countries prefer bilateral aid and NGOs as their 
main channel of aid. Strictly speaking, one cannot accuse countries of free riding in matters of 
bilateral aid as it is by definition a transaction between two partners. However, within the 
context of the ICPD Programme of action bilateral aid is part of a ‘social contract’ between 
OECD countries to carry one third of the global burden of providing reproductive health and 
HIV/AIDS services and goods. Within this context, all contributions – no matter which 
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channel one chooses – are part of the global public effort and apparently large countries pay 
disproportionately in supporting NGOs and domestic governments. However, what started out 
as a question of burden sharing, the estimation results suggest that in order to understand 
burden sharing more fully, specific country characteristics are important. Especially factors 
such as religion, the pro-foreign aid stance and government size of a country are good 
predictors of differences in funding between countries. The most distracting outcome may 
well be that fact that donors hardly pay attention to the state of development of recipient 
countries, or to state this with more nuances: the domestic conditions of the donor in 
determining the level of aid outweigh the conditions of the least developed countries. And 
perhaps this ‘fact’ is what outrages most policy advocates and NGOs involved in dealing with 
reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. However, management by speech, which advocates so 
abundantly use, will never attain the goals which donors so ambitiously set at conferences and 
world summits. The most complex of all public goods are global public goods and in that 
respect we should not expect more funds from simple pleas, no matter how well intended and 
balanced these pleas are stated. And in that respect examining the full array of issues 
surrounding the production and management of global public goods (cf. Kaul and Conceicao, 
2004) is a more promising road. 
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ENDNOTES  
 
                                                          
1 Or in the words of the ICPD programme of action: “All countries should take steps to meet the family planning 
needs of their populations as soon as possible and should, in all cases by the year 2015, seek to provide universal 
access to a full range of safe and reliable family planning methods and to related reproductive health services 
which are not against the law.” (par. 7.16) 
2 This is also the main reason why Schindlmayer (2004) stops his review of population programs in the year 
1995. 
3 We follow at this point by means of analogy the exposition of Sandler and Hartley (2001). 
4 Of course, an alternative strategy is to limit the number of countries which receive aid. 
5  All continuous variables are expressed in logarithmic terms. 
6 The estimation model used is Generalized Least Squares with panel specific autoregressive processes of order 
1, AR(1) to correct for serial correlation in errors, and a correction for heteroskedasticity, i.e. differences in 
variance across panel members. 
7 To circumvent arbitrary decisions in pinpointing the change in income inequality over time, these variables are 
fixed per country and in some cases it is even impossible because only one observation per country is available. 
8 We have considered alternative religious variables such as the leading religion in a country, the level of 
religious pluralism or the fact that a country has a state religion (see Barro and McCleary, 2004). The two most 
dominant religions of a country provided the best fit, although the conclusions do not differ substantially when 
alternative religious variables are used. The two most dominant religions in a country have been used as our 
preferred choice of religion variable. 
9 At the International Conference on Population in Mexico City, the U.S. delegation, headed by James Buckley, 
announces that the United States will no longer fund foreign, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that 
provide, refer, counsel, or advocate for abortion. These restrictions were an executive branch policy in effect 
until 1993, but never became part of the permanent foreign assistance statute. It became known as the Mexico 
City Policy, and was later dubbed the "Global Gag Rule" by its opponents. 
10 The reason for restricting attention to the United States is that the shares in equation (5) have to sum up to 1 
and tracing an effect in one country has to be compensated by others. Therefore, a variable which has a common 
value for all countries cannot be used. If the Mexico City Policy affects funding policies of individual countries 
than, e.g., the share of the non-US donors should go up in the ‘Gag years’ while the share of the US could goes 
down. 
